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COMMENT
Fumbling the First Amendment:
The Right of Publicity Goes 2–0 Against
Freedom of Expression
Thomas E. Kadri*
Two circuits in one summer found in favor of college athletes in right-of-pub-
licity suits filed against the makers of the NCAA Football videogame. Both
panels split 2–1; both applied the transformative use test; both dissenters pre-
dicted chilling consequences. By insisting that the likeness of each player be
“transformed,” the Third and Ninth Circuits employed a test that imperils the
use of realistic depictions of public figures in expressive works. This standard
could have frosty implications for artists in a range of media: docudramas,
biographies, and works of historical fiction may be at risk. This Comment
examines the tension between the right of publicity and the First Amendment
and argues for a bright-line test that ensures greater protection for creators of
expressive works.
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Introduction
Prominence has its pitfalls. A rich respect for commentary on public
figures pervades our First Amendment tradition.1 As Justice Frankfurter
observed, “One of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to
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1. After all, “[t]hose who won our independence believed . . . that public discussion is a
political duty.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see
also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 164 (1967).
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criticize public men and measures.”2 We hold dear the “free flow of ideas”3
and insist that expression must remain “uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open.”4 Behind these ideals lies a simple principle: limits on the content of
speech must be scrutinized.5 When creators of expressive works fret about
the content of those works, we all suffer from the chilling effects. Judges
must proceed with care when they restrict an artist’s ability to engage with a
particular subject.
Two circuits in one summer faced an identical question: When an ex-
pressive work contains a realistic portrayal of a public figure without that
person’s permission, does the First Amendment protect the creator against a
right-of-publicity claim?6 Both courts essentially said that it does not. If art-
ists wish to depict public figures, they must now sufficiently “transform” the
person’s likeness or obtain consent.7
This Comment argues that these courts erred in requiring that a likeness
be “transformed” when used in an expressive work. Courts should instead
shield creators of expressive works from right-of-publicity claims unless the
creators use a realistic portrayal that is wholly unrelated to the content of
their work or is simply a disguised commercial advertisement. Part I in-
troduces the friction between the right of publicity and freedom of expres-
sion. Part II chronicles the haphazard balancing tests that laid the shaky
foundations for both decisions last summer. Finally, Part III argues for a
bright-line test that leaves artists unencumbered when they use realistic por-
trayal, while still preserving the right of publicity to combat false
endorsement.
I. The Right of Publicity vs. Freedom of Expression
The right of publicity emerged, paradoxically, from the right to privacy.8
States began to fashion statutory and common law remedies to protect the
2. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673–74 (1944).
3. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
4. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
5. “The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the de-
velopment and well-being of our free society and are indispensable to its continued growth.
Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent their erosion . . . .” Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 488 (1957) (footnote omitted).
6. Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
7. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276–79; Hart, 717 F.3d at 166–69.
8. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 1:23 (2013 ed.
2013). Compare Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995) (“One who ap-
propriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s
name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability . . . .”),
with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (1977) (“One who appropriates to his own use
or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy.”).
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property interests of people already in the public eye.9 Now, over half of the
states have laws granting people a “right of publicity,” or “the right to pre-
vent the unauthorized use of their names, likenesses, and other indicia of
identity.”10 The right of publicity advances a variety of societal interests, in-
cluding “fostering creativity, safeguarding the individual’s enjoyment of the
fruits of her labors, preventing consumer deception, and preventing unjust
enrichment.”11
But the right of publicity creates problems for free speech. Friction be-
tween two competing ideals—a right to control the use of one’s identity and
a right to create expressive works—presents a constitutional dilemma. This
friction increases because the First Amendment protects not only political
speech but also “[e]ntertainment . . . motion pictures, programs broadcast
by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dra-
matic works.”12 Moreover, the fact that many media are “published and sold
for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose
liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.”13 Thus, a right to protect
the commercial worth of one’s identity and a right for others to comment
expressively on that identity are natural foes, often at loggerheads.
The Supreme Court skimmed the surface of this issue in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., its only foray into parsing the First
Amendment in a right-of-publicity context.14 Mr. Zacchini was a “human
cannonball” who performed his stunt at a local fair.15 When a news outlet
9. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West 1997); Gignilliat v. Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis,
L.L.P., 684 S.E.2d 756, 760 (2009).
10. Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the Right of Publicity with First
Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 Colum. J.L. & Arts 165, 166 (2010) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); accord 2 McCarthy, supra note 8, § 6:3.
11. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity v. The First Amendment: A Property
and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 Ind. L.J. 47, 54 (1994) (footnotes omitted); see also Palmer v.
Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (“Perhaps the basic
and underlying theory is that a person has the right to enjoy the fruits of his own industry free
from unjustified interference. It is unfair that one should be permitted to commercialize or
exploit or capitalize upon another’s name, reputation or accomplishments merely because the
owner’s accomplishments have been highly publicized.” (citations omitted)).
12. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981). Indeed, the First
Amendment protects “[e]ven dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artis-
tic expression.” IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 271–72 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted)), aff’d, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
13. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952); see also Harte-Hanks
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989) (“If a profit motive could somehow
strip communications of the otherwise available constitutional protection, our cases from New
York Times to Hustler Magazine would be little more than empty vessels.”).
14. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The decision prompted a vigorous dissent from Justice Powell,
who worried it “could lead to a degree of media self-censorship” and cabin broadcasters to
“watered-down verbal reporting, perhaps with an occasional still picture.” Zacchini, 433 U.S.
at 580–81 (Powell, J., dissenting). Ultimately, he sighed, “The public is then the loser.” Id. at
581.
15. Id. at 563 (majority opinion).
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aired footage of the daredevil’s entire act, he sued, claiming the broadcast
violated his right of publicity.16 The news outlet sought refuge under the
First Amendment, but to no avail; Zacchini’s claim could proceed.17 The
Court demanded a balancing test to weigh the interests underpinning the
right of publicity and the right to free speech, although it failed to dictate
precisely how that balancing should occur.18
As a result of Zacchini’s vague demands, lower courts haphazardly spec-
ulated about what test to apply. Chaotic application of these disparate stan-
dards left both courts and artists in a state of confusion and uncertainty.
II. Hart, Keller, and the Transformative Use Test
Last summer’s two decisions emerged from the shaky foundations laid
by Zacchini. The plaintiffs in both lawsuits were former college athletes.
Ryan Hart and Sam Keller filed essentially identical complaints against Elec-
tronic Arts (“EA”), the creator of the NCAA Football videogame. The players
alleged that the videogame violated their right of publicity by featuring their
virtual avatars.19 EA sought protection under the First Amendment.20 The
main issue presented in each case was which test the court should apply to
balance EA’s First Amendment rights and the players’ right of publicity.
16. Id. at 563–64.
17. Id. at 564, 578–79.
18. See id. at 574–75. Some commentators have rightly stressed the narrowness of
Zacchini’s holding, which addressed the rare instance when a news outlet airs a performer’s
entire act. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L.
Rev. 903, 906 (2003). The dissenters in Zacchini expressed similar sentiments, remarking that
the majority’s decision was “based on repeated incantation of a single formula: ‘a performer’s
entire act.’ ” Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting).
19. EA did not pay the players—nor could it under the strict NCAA compensation rules.
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967, 2013 WL
5778233, at *1–4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013). The complex antitrust issues at play merit their
own Comment, and the battle surrounding their legality is still ongoing in federal court. Id.
But the fact that professional athletes enjoy lucrative licensing agreements—while their col-
legiate counterparts may not—should not impact the First Amendment calculus. Just as a
screenwriter might seek “life rights” to avert a lawsuit by a celebrity depicted in his film, so too
videogame companies might wish to obtain waivers through costly agreements with the play-
ers and teams. The salient question is whether the First Amendment should render these pre-
cautionary measures superfluous.
20. EA could raise a First Amendment defense because videogames enjoy full protection
as expressive works. The Supreme Court unequivocally so held in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n, explaining that videogames “communicate ideas—and even social
messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and mu-
sic) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the
virtual world).” 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). As such, they are “as much entitled to the
protection of free speech as the best of literature.” Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2737 n.4 (quoting
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Hart and Keller championed the transformative use test.21 Created by the
California Supreme Court, this test considers five factors: first, whether the
likeness is one of the “raw materials” from which an original work is synthe-
sized; second, whether the work is primarily the defendant’s own expression;
third, whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements predominate
in the work; fourth, whether the marketability and economic value of the
challenged work derives primarily from the fame of the person depicted; and
fifth, whether an artist’s skill and talent have been manifestly subordinated
to the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a public figure so as
to commercially exploit the person’s fame.22
In principle, the transformative use test asks whether the expressive
work adds significant creative elements “so as to be transformed into some-
thing more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.”23 The test recog-
nizes—at least in theory—that “[w]hat the right of publicity holder
possesses is not a right of censorship, but a right to prevent others from
misappropriating the economic value generated by the celebrity’s fame.”24
The inquiry is “more quantitative than qualitative, asking whether the literal
and imitative or the creative elements predominate in the work.”25 The ra-
tionale behind the test is that “when a work contains significant transforma-
tive elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment
protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic interest
protected by the right of publicity.”26 At least according to the court that
created it, the test should leave breathing room for creative contributions
that engage with factual reporting and fictionalized portrayal.27
In practice, however, the test has not proved so forgiving. In No Doubt
v. Activision Publishing—a case that heavily influenced the Hart and Keller
courts28—a videogame creator was unable to present a successful First
Amendment defense because its game did not “transform” the members of a
21. Appellee’s Brief at 25–33, Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name
& Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 10-15387); Appellant’s Open-
ing Brief at 34–48, Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-3750).
22. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809–10 (Cal. 2001); see
also 2 McCarthy, supra note 8, § 8:72.
23. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799.
24. Id. at 807.
25. Id. at 809. The Comedy III court invoked copyright law’s “fair use” doctrine, citing
the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. in holding that the central
purpose of the fair use inquiry “is to see . . . whether the new work merely ‘supersede[s] the
objects’ of the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in
other words, whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’ ” Comedy III, 21
P.3d at 808 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26. Id. at 808.
27. Id. at 809.
28. See Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1275–79 (9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 166–69
(3d Cir. 2013).
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famous band into anything other than “exact depictions” of them doing
“exactly what they do as celebrities.”29 The very fact that the portrayals were
realistic led the court to deny protection to the artists.
Although two California state courts applied the transformative use test
to protect expressive works that featured portrayals of public figures, those
characters were unrealistic depictions. The first court protected a comic book
featuring two “villainous half-worm, half-human offspring” named Johnny
and Edgar Autumn, parodies of sibling rock duo Johnny and Edgar Winter.30
Although the Winter brothers clearly inspired the mutant cartoons, the par-
ody was enough to “transform” their likeness and earn the comic books
First Amendment protection. Similarly, the second court protected a vide-
ogame starring a character easily identified as singer Kierin Kirby.31 Kirby’s
avatar was “fanciful” and appeared “in outer space in the 25th Century.”32
Again, unrealism served as a proxy for transformation.
Against this backdrop, Hart and Keller pitched their twin cases to the
Third and Ninth Circuits. The players were armed with No Doubt and
launched a blunt attack on realistic portrayal in expressive works. Although
the game’s virtual avatars are nameless, the physical attributes and statistical
data leave no doubt as to their identity. For example, Hart’s digital persona
sports his number 13 jersey, stands at 6’2”, weighs 197 pounds, and even
dons the quarterback’s trademark wrist band on his left arm.33 Up against a
work that candidly strives for realism, the plaintiffs had plenty of
ammunition.34
The courts sided with the players and applied a narrow construction of
the transformative use test.35 Because the avatars were so realistic, the statis-
tics were historically accurate, and the athletes starred for their actual col-
leges in their actual stadiums, both courts held that EA had not sufficiently
“transformed” each individual player’s likeness.36 The creators could not
seek First Amendment protection because the videogame “literally recreates”
29. No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400–01, 411 (Ct. App.
2011).
30. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003).
31. Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 609, 618 (Ct. App. 2006).
32. Id. at 610, 618.
33. Hart, 717 F.3d at 145–46, 147 n.8. Similarly, Keller appears in both Arizona State’s
maroon and gold and Nebraska’s scarlet and cream; everything from his hairstyle to passing
style is mimicked to near perfection. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1272.
34. Each edition of the NCAA Football videogame features over 100 virtual teams popu-
lated by thousands of players who resemble their real-life counterparts. EA’s playbook man-
ager labors to replicate each team’s actual playbook, and the graphic artists create virtual
versions of real stadiums filled with coaches, referees, mascots, cheerleaders, and fans. Even
“the crunch of the players’ pads” and “the roar of the crowd” provide the avid gamer with a
lifelike experience. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271; accord Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 & n.6.
35. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276; Hart, 717 F.3d at 165. The construction was “narrow” in the
sense that the courts focused on whether each individual likeness was “transformed” as op-
posed to whether the work as a whole was “transformative.” See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276; Hart,
717 F.3d at 165.
36. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276–79; Hart, 717 F.3d at 166, 169.
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each player “in the very setting in which he has achieved renown.”37 The
players had successfully used the game’s realism against its creators.
III. A Bright Line: Protecting Realism in Expressive Works
The First Amendment requires a bright-line rule to protect the rights of
those who use realistic portrayals of public figures in expressive works. The
transformative use test is unwieldy and verbose. It tempts courts to judge the
artistic value of expressive works in a manner that censors speech and belit-
tles our rich First Amendment tradition. Most importantly, transformation
and realism are antithetical: a test that requires one leaves no room for the
other.
The skeleton of a better test already exists. Sometimes called the Rogers
test,38 sometimes the Restatement test,39 it usually appears in the context of
trademark law.40 For consistency, let’s rechristen it the bright-line test.
For right-of-publicity claims, the bright-line test would first ask whether
the challenged speech is commercial or expressive. Commercial speech does
no more than propose a transaction.41 If the speech is purely commercial,
the claim may proceed; if it is expressive, the inquiry continues.
The bright-line test would then presume that the use of the person’s
likeness in the expressive work is permitted unless that use is “wholly unre-
lated” to the content of the work42 or is “simply a disguised commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”43 The use is wholly unre-
lated if it has no artistic relevance whatsoever to the underlying work.44 And
it is a disguised commercial advertisement if it explicitly misleads the public
37. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271; see also Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (“The digital Ryan Hart does
what the actual Ryan Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college football . . . . This is not
transformative . . . .”).
38. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
39. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. c (1995) (stating that
“use in entertainment and other creative works” is permitted, unless “the name or likeness is
used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified person”).
40. See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir.
2012); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008);
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 & n.11 (6th Cir. 2003); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989).
41. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980);
see also Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[T]he core notion of commercial speech is that it does no more than propose a commercial
transaction.” (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted))).
42. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d
454, 457 n.6 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
43. Id. (quoting Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlop, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (App. Div. 1980)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
44. See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 547 F.3d at 1100 (“[T]he level of relevance merely must be
above zero.”).
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by making an affirmative statement of the person’s sponsorship or endorse-
ment beyond mere use of the likeness.45
So far, this style of bright-line analysis has scarcely appeared in right-of-
publicity suits.46 But it is preferable because, unlike the transformative use
test, it protects an artist’s First Amendment right to use realistic portrayals
of public figures in an expressive work—without needing to transform the
person’s likeness. The constitutional right to free expression should protect
realism because realism serves two core First Amendment goals: commen-
tary on public figures47 and public enjoyment of expressive works.48 The
bright-line test also preserves the right of publicity for its principal use:
preventing commercial exploitation through false endorsement.49
Commentary on public figures is a fundamental feature of our First
Amendment tradition.50 It is therefore essential that courts do not permit
the right of publicity to impede expressive works that realistically portray
these public figures. The bright-line test protects media that rely on realism
in a way that the transformative use test cannot.
Public figures are embedded in the fabric of our culture.51 They are
“common points of reference for millions of individuals who may never
interact with one another, but who share, by virtue of their participation in
a mediated culture, a common experience and a collective memory.”52 One
commentator aptly notes as follows:
[C]elebrities are the leading players in our Public Drama. We tell tales,
both tall and cautionary, about them. We monitor their comings and go-
ings, their missteps and heartbreaks. We copy their mannerisms, their
styles, their modes of conversation and of consumption. Whether or not
45. Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 WL 2457678, at
*6 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011).
46. In Matthews v. Wozencraft, the Fifth Circuit found that the First Amendment pro-
tected a novel, noting that it made no difference whether the book was viewed as a historical
or a fictional work, “so long as it is not ‘simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the
sale of goods or services.’” 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004).
Similarly, in Parks v. LaFace Records, the Sixth Circuit considered whether a rap song entitled
“Rosa Parks” violated the icon’s right of publicity by analyzing if the title was “wholly unre-
lated” to the lyrics. 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003). But see ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc.,
332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003) (confining Parks to its facts and applying the transformative
use test instead of the bright-line analysis).
47. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–52 (1988).
48. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998.
49. Supra text accompanying note 45.
50. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50 (“At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of
the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public inter-
est and concern.”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (observing that
public figures “invite attention and comment”); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665,
673–74 (1944).
51. As the Court stressed in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, “Our citizenry has a legitimate
and substantial interest in the conduct of [public figures].” 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967).
52. John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture 163 (1990); see also
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 1996).
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celebrities are “the chief agents of moral change in the United States,” they
certainly are widely used—far more than are institutionally anchored
elites—to symbolize individual aspirations, group identities, and cultural
values. Their images are thus important expressive and communicative re-
sources: the peculiar, yet familiar idiom in which we conduct a fair portion
of our cultural business and everyday conversation.53
Parody and satire can be powerful expressive tools. But artists should
not be confined to those stylistic devices; realism is equally valuable. Impor-
tantly, the bright-line test does not allow for “alternative means” argu-
ments.54 In other words, it is irrelevant whether the use of a particular
person’s likeness is absolutely necessary to the artist’s expressive goals. The
use need not be the only way to express the content of the work; for it to
have artistic relevance, what matters is that it is not “wholly unrelated.”55
If courts adopt the bright-line test, they can ensure that public figures
do not turn their right of publicity into a right of censorship.56 Life under
the transformative use test is wildly different: now, before an artist can use
realistic depiction, he must obtain permission. EA, for example, must ap-
proach every one of the roughly 7,500 athletes who play NCAA Division I
football to request a license. Each player has veto power; he could either
refuse to be part of the work or—perhaps worse—condition his participa-
tion on EA’s agreement to distort reality by improving his skill level or di-
minishing that of his fiercest rival.57 As one commentator notes, that
leverage “would be anathema to the core concept of free speech and a free
press.”58 Robust commentary cannot survive under a system that elevates
permission over expression.
The bright-line test’s protection of realism serves the second core First
Amendment goal of public enjoyment.59 Consumers of artistic works have
53. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 125, 128 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
54. See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1043
(C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008).
55. See Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 WL 2457678,
at *4 & n.2 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir.
1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
56. See 2 McCarthy, supra note 8, § 8:64, at 223 (“If the law mandated that the permis-
sion of every living person . . . must be obtained to include mention of them in news and
stories, both in documentary and docudrama telling, then they would have the right to refuse
permission unless the story was told ‘their way.’ ”).
57. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,
54 Duke L.J. 1, 142 (2004).
58. 2 McCarthy, supra note 8, § 8:64.
59. Justice Brandeis famously saw freedom of expression as “essential to effective democ-
racy,” for “[i]t is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.”
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Marshall
echoed these lofty sentiments when he wrote that free speech serves the needs “of the human
spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression. Such expression is an integral part of the devel-
opment of ideas and a sense of identity.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974)
(Marshall, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401
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an interest in enjoying the results of an artist’s free expression.60 Realistic
portrayal is an important feature of our diverse creative palate.
“[E]sthetic and moral judgments about art and literature . . . are for the
individual to make, not for the Government to decree . . . .”61 True to that
sentiment, the bright-line test leaves no room for judges to be art critics
because it sets clear standards that will not scare speech. Judges routinely
distinguish between commercial and expressive speech,62 and the “wholly
unrelated” and “disguised commercial advertisement” prongs establish plain
factors for courts to analyze.63
The Hart and Keller decisions offer no such clarity. Vague standards and
free speech make a noxious cocktail: uncertainty creates a chilling effect on
expression.64 And standards that invite subjectivity breed uncertainty; as Jus-
tice Holmes warned, “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”65
The transformative use test fails to heed that warning. By asking, as one
factor does, whether “an artist’s skill and talent is manifestly subordinated to
the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait,”66 the test supplies judges
(1989). To suppress it, he added, “is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and
affront the individual’s worth and dignity.” Id.; see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 787 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The breadth of this protec-
tion evinces recognition that freedom of expression is . . . intrinsic to individual liberty and
dignity and instrumental in society’s search for truth.”).
60. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 27(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948)
(“Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the
arts . . . .”).
61. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). Wary that
judges might be tempted to act on their own biases about the artistic worth of videogames,
Justice Scalia was characteristically candid in his Brown opinion: “Reading Dante is unques-
tionably more cultured and intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat. But these cul-
tural and intellectual differences are not constitutional ones.” Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n,
131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 n.4 (2011).
62. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 41.
63. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
64. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997) (“The vagueness of
such a regulation raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling ef-
fect on free speech.”); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (“[T]he vice of unconstitu-
tional vagueness is further aggravated where, as here, the statute in question operates to inhibit
the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively protected by the Constitution.” (quoting
Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
65. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); see also Frosch v.
Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (App. Div. 1980) (“It is not for a court to pass
on literary categories, or literary judgment. . . . [F]ree expression is so important that we
should not extend any right of publicity . . . against the publication of a literary work . . . .”).
66. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001).
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with a subjective standard and little guidance. Because artists now risk liabil-
ity if they dabble in realistic portrayal, they might choose precaution over
expression and refrain from realism altogether.67
Even if artists do take the risk, the public might still be shortchanged.
The requirement of transformation might tempt creators of expressive
works to make pedantic alterations to their realistic portrayals in the hopes
of adequately “transforming” the likeness. Instead of freely engaging with
the subject, artists might resort to pointless gamesmanship to probe the lim-
its of the transformative use test. The decisions in Hart and Keller leave no
discernible standard to apply in assessing whether the players’ likenesses
would have been sufficiently transformed if, for example, Hart’s avatar was
“175 pounds (instead of 197), 5’9” (instead of 6’2”), and wore number 14
(instead of 13) with a wrist band on his right arm (instead of his left).”68
Such questions may seem petty, but the putative class in Keller only included
players whose virtual equivalents were “within one inch of the player’s roster
height and . . . within 10% of the player’s roster weight.”69 The First Amend-
ment should not tangle with such trivialities.
Moreover, public figures like Hart and Keller may actually suffer if they
encourage courts to adopt the transformative use test. Artists might shun
accurate and flattering portrayals of public figures and instead resort to
“over-the-top and insulting caricatures.”70 Ultimately, public enjoyment of
diverse expressive works will bear the brunt. Realism is too vivid an artistic
tool to squander. The bright-line test ensures that artists do not sink to self-
censorship for fear of litigation.
Admittedly, the transformative use test has appealed to courts for good
reason. It is undeniable that “works containing ‘significant transformative
elements’ are less likely to interfere with the economic interests implicated
by the right of publicity”71 because such works tend to be poor “substitutes
for conventional depictions of the celebrity.”72 As a result, “transformed”
67. This fear is precisely why “[f]reedoms of expression require ‘breathing space.’ ” Phila.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 272 (1964)); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); Baggett,
377 U.S. at 372 (warning that vague standards force potential speakers to “steer far wider of
the unlawful zone” (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (internal quotation
marks omitted))).
68. Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee by Advance Publications et al. at 5, Hart
v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-3750); see also supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
69. Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at para. 331, In re NCAA Stu-
dent-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2013).
70. Len Niehoff, Letter to the Editor, When Winning Could Get Ugly, N.Y. Times, Nov.
21, 2010, at SP10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/sports/21inbox.html
(“Thus, Tim Tebow, the devoutly religious Florida Gator who wore No. 15, could become Tim
Bowtie, the Satan-worshipping Florida Gator who wears No. 666. . . . [I]t may be hard for
college athletes to think of it as much of a victory.”).
71. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 159 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Comedy III, 21
P.3d at 808).
72. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808.
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works will not usually threaten the celebrity’s ability to profit from the use
of his likeness. Faced with a surge in statutory protection for the right of
publicity,73 courts reasonably sought to honor the legislative will. But in se-
lecting the scales, those courts erroneously judged all weights as equal: they
balanced a property interest against an expressive right as if the two were
peers. The Constitution begs to differ. The right to free expression carries
more clout than an interest in a property value—even property as personal
as one’s own likeness. In that sense, labeling it a “right” of publicity is per-
haps a misnomer, and it is unsurprising that legislatures and courts have
gradually given it undue weight when balancing it against the First
Amendment.
Importantly, though, the bright-line test’s enhanced protection of realis-
tic portrayal will not prevent public figures from fighting misuse of their
identity through other viable causes of action, including defamation, false
light, invasion of privacy, and public disclosure of private facts.74 The bright-
line test also preserves two important targets for right-of-publicity claims.
First, public figures may still challenge unauthorized use in purely commer-
cial expression.75 Speech that does no more than propose a transaction un-
derstandably merits a diminished level of protection: it does not benefit the
public or serve the First Amendment’s core goals to the same degree.76 Sec-
ond, the bright-line test’s “disguised commercial advertisement” prong hon-
ors a principal goal of the right of publicity: it disavows commercial
exploitation through false endorsement. If we accept that unauthorized use
of a person’s likeness can devalue the authorized use of that likeness, this
prong can provide sturdy protection to public figures should an imposter
seek refuge under the First Amendment’s defense of expressive works.
Conclusion
Twenty-two years before the California Supreme Court invented the
transformative use test, a wise predecessor on that court declared that “[n]o
author should be forced into creating mythological worlds or characters
wholly divorced from reality.”77 Indeed, “prominence invites creative com-
ment.”78 The decisions in Hart and Keller fail to honor the right to free
73. 2 McCarthy, supra note 8, § 6:8 (providing a chart of state statutes protecting the
right of publicity).
74. See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996); McFarland
v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d
831 (6th Cir. 1983). Additionally, public figures will still be free to pursue lucrative contracts
from those who seek to portray them in expressive works in exchange for unfettered access and
nonpublic information that could enhance the piece. The bright-line test does not prohibit
this form of negotiation; it merely aligns the balance of power in favor of the creators of
expressive works.
75. See cases cited supra note 41.
76. See cases cited supra note 41.
77. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 1979) (en banc)
(Bird, C.J., concurring).
78. Id.
June 2014] Fumbling the First Amendment 1531
expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. By requiring transforma-
tion, courts could imperil expressive works of all kinds—not just vide-
ogames. How could Andy Warhol possibly begin to mount a defense of his
acclaimed pop art when all he “transformed” was the color scheme? How
much variation of shade or tone would suffice to earn him protection? These
are questions that artists should not be forced to answer. But under Hart
and Keller they must. The bright-line test promotes the core First Amend-
ment goals of commentary and public enjoyment while also avoiding the
chilling effect bred by a subjective balancing test. If we value realistic por-
trayal of public figures in expressive works, we cannot continue to fumble.
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